Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale

About This Scale

The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS) was developed by Brotherton, French, and Pickering (2013) as a tool to measure individual differences in conspiracist thinking. Unlike scales focused on specific conspiracy theories, the GCBS captures a general tendency to see events as the product of secret, coordinated action by powerful groups.

Research shows that conspiracist beliefs exist on a spectrum and are influenced by cognitive styles, personality traits, social identity, and situational factors. Holding some conspiracist beliefs does not indicate any mental health condition or personal deficiency.

Conspiracy Theories as a Reflection on Human Nature

Conspiracy theories often emerge in response to events that feel threatening, incomprehensible, or morally outrageous. They offer narrative structures that restore a sense of control and coherence — even when the narrative may not align with available evidence.

From a psychological perspective, conspiracist thinking can be understood as a byproduct of otherwise adaptive mental processes: pattern detection (seeing agency in noise), proportionality bias (expecting big causes for big effects), and the need for cognitive closure (disliking ambiguity). The question is not whether these tendencies exist, but how we become aware of them and choose to manage their influence.

Navigating the Information Environment

We live in an era of unprecedented information abundance — and unprecedented noise. Some conspiracy theories function as that noise: they crowd out careful reasoning, encourage conformity to tribal narratives, and channel legitimate distrust into blind submission to alternative orthodoxies.

The challenge is not to simply reject all non-mainstream ideas, nor to uncritically accept official accounts. It is to cultivate the discernment to evaluate claims based on evidence, logic, and intellectual humility — regardless of which "side" they come from.

Cultivating Critical Thinking

• Expose yourself to diverse, high-quality information sources — including those you may disagree with.
• Practice epistemic humility: recognize the limits of your own knowledge and the complexity of most real-world events.
• Distinguish between correlation and causation, between coincidence and pattern, between speculation and evidence.
• Be aware of confirmation bias: we all tend to notice information that confirms what we already believe.
• Consider the motivations and evidence quality behind every claim — whether from governments, corporations, media, or independent voices.

Interpreting Your Results

Your score reflects your current tendency to endorse the types of statements presented. It is a snapshot, not a definitive label. Beliefs can and do shift over time with new experiences, information, and reflection.

A higher score suggests greater openness to conspiracist explanations. This may reflect healthy skepticism, existential anxiety, alienation from institutions, or a combination of factors. A lower score suggests greater trust in conventional explanations — which itself carries its own risks, such as complacency toward genuine wrongdoing.

Toward Constructive Engagement

Whatever your results, the goal of this exercise is not to categorize you but to invite reflection. Healthy societies need people who think critically, question assumptions, and remain open to revising their views.

If you found this thought-provoking, consider bringing the same reflective spirit to other areas of your life — your relationships, your work, your community. The capacity for self-examination is one of the most constructive tools we possess.

References

• Brotherton, R., French, C. C., & Pickering, A. D. (2013). Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 279. 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279
• Brotherton, R. (2015). Suspicious minds: Why we believe conspiracy theories. Bloomsbury Publishing.
• van Prooijen, J.-W., & Douglas, K. M. (2017). Conspiracy theories as part of worldview: Significance and social implications. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 538–42.
• Lantian, A., Muller, D., Aïte, A., & Douglas, K. M. (2021). Measuring generic conspiracy beliefs: Validation of a French translation of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 175, 110706.
• Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., et al. (2019). Understanding conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 40(S1), 3-35. 10.1111/pops.12568
• Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15(4), 731–42.